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Over the past decade historians and philosophers of science have developed an interest in 
Feynman diagrams, the simple, yet immensely powerful visual representations of subatomic 
events developed by Richard Feynman in the 1940s. Historical works like David Kaiser’s Drawing 
Theories Apart and Adrian Wüthrich’s recent doctoral thesis Feynman’s Struggle and Dyson’s 
Surprise Revelation (not to mention Sam Schweber’s older work on the subject) have described 
how Feynman diagrams were developed and propagated. Philosophers such as James Brown 
and Letitia Meynell have discussed the question of what, precisely, Feynman diagrams 
represent. However, despite all the recent work contextualizing Feynman diagrams within 
Feynman’s theoretical struggles, the post-doctoral and international academic systems, and the 
philosophical questions surrounding representation, few scholars have viewed Feynman 
diagrams as one of many visual techniques produced by Richard Feynman. Despite the 
excellent nature of many of these works, the majority of scholars who have addressed 
Feynman’s diagrams have been seeing the forest for the trees: by focusing on “Feynman 
diagrams” at the expense of the numerous other types of diagrams used by Feynman, debates 
over the role of diagrams in scientific thought and the nature of visual reasoning have been 
unnecessarily narrowed.  
 
This paper aims to step back and address the plurality of diagrams produced by Feynman, 
“Feynman diagrams” included, within their historical and textual context. In particular, I shall 
give a substantive account of how Feynman used diagrams in the first lectures in which he was 
tasked with explaining his new approach to quantum electrodynamics, those delivered at the 
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor and at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), in 
1949 and 1950, respectively. By critically examining unpublished course notes to two lecture 
series (which, to my knowledge, have not yet been discussed by historians and philosophers of 
science), Feynman’s use and interpretation of diagrams, both “Feynman diagrams” and 
otherwise, will be illuminated.  
 
While Feynman’s early lectures contained a wide spectrum of diagrams employed in a 
multitude of ways, a hidden structure underlies his pedagogical use of images. The diverse 
forms of diagrams becomes comprehensible once each image is understood within its textual 
context, namely, the pedagogical point underlying its production. While each diagram was 
crafted to meet a specific, local need, we shall nevertheless be able to characterize several 
general themes regarding their use: diagrams could be used heuristically (as a conceptual aid to 
physical principles of his theory), computationally (as a mathematical tool), or as a heuristic aid 
to understanding the mathematical details of his approach.  
 
While it is clear that Feynman modified each individual diagram to suit particular needs within 
the context of his lectures, a general visual style nevertheless persisted. This style, reminiscent 
of Minkowski space-time diagrams familiar to his audience, allowed him to move between 
morphologically distinct, yet stylistically similar, diagrams with ease. In doing so, Feynman 
employed his audiences’ ability to reason and understand images analogically to facilitate the 
transmission of both general concepts and mathematical minutia relevant to his “new 
approach” to quantum electrodynamics. In examining how Feynman used such similar, yet 
distinct, diagrams through these lectures, we shall gain insight into nature of visual and 
analogical reasoning, subjects frequently discussed by historians and philosophers of science 
with a particular interest in cognitive science, such as Nancy Nersessian and the late David 
Gooding.  
 
Furthermore, by situating these lectures within the context of previous and subsequent 
diagrams drawn by Feynman, we gain insight into the formation and establishment of scientific 
tools. When compared with Feynman’s early diagrams, drawn in the years previous to these 
lectures (which were highly variable and rather ad hoc), and his increasingly widespread 
adoption of “Feynman diagrams” in later years, these lectures can be viewed as a “middle 
period”, an era in which Feynman diagrams were present, but whose role was severely limited 
(though whether this was primarily due to Feynman’s audiences’ limited familiarity with 
Feynman diagrams and not to Feynman’s latter recognition of the multitude of ways in which 
these diagrams could be used is a matter of debate). The insight gained into how Feynman 
diagrams were transformed from a purely computational device to a generalized (and, 
according to Kaiser, quite malleable) tool for scientific reasoning, synonymous with subatomic 
interactions themselves, particularly within their early context of being simply one of many 
types of diagrams, is quite valuable, as it can help in understanding the historical formation of 
standards within scientific practice.  
 
Due to time constraints, it is unlikely that the totality of this paper will be able to be presented 
at &HPS3. Regardless of which sections will be discussed, the importance of primary-source 
historical research in providing both stand-alone histories of science and critical insight into 
philosophical questions will be stressed. My talk will hopefully provide others with an example 
of how serious historical research can be used to address contemporary philosophical issues, 
such as visual and analogical reasoning and the formation and mutation of theoretical scientific 
tools, and how philosophical inquiries can, in turn, guide historical investigations.   
 
